Insolvency Timing and Managerial Decision-Making
An Experimental Study of Alignment of Managerial Decision-Making on Insolvency Timing with Shareholder Interests in Germany
Insolvency Timing and Managerial Decision-Making
An Experimental Study of Alignment of Managerial Decision-Making on Insolvency Timing with Shareholder Interests in Germany
Frederik Drescher addresses the timing of non-mandatory insolvency filings based on threatening illiquidity (
18 InsO) with the aim of a company's restructuring as an agency problem between owners and management. The hypothesis of a tendency towards delayed insolvency filings, which was developed using a decision model, is experimentally confirmed. Moreover, the author analyzes different incentive instruments potentially leading to earlier insolvency filings.
Managerial Insolvency Timing Decision
Experimental Testing of Interest Alignment Instruments.
InInsolvency Timing as an Agency Problem
Financial Distress and Insolvency TimingManagerial Insolvency Timing Decision
Experimental Testing of Interest Alignment Instruments.
Drescher, Frederik
| ISBN | 978-3-658-02818-3 |
|---|---|
| Medientyp | Buch |
| Auflage | 2014 |
| Copyrightjahr | 2013 |
| Verlag | Springer, Berlin |
| Umfang | XVII, 191 Seiten |
| Sprache | Englisch |
